On lengths of proofs in non-classical logics  by Hrubeš, Pavel
Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 157 (2009) 194–205
Contents lists available at ScienceDirect
Annals of Pure and Applied Logic
journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/apal
On lengths of proofs in non-classical logics
Pavel Hrubeš
Department of Computer Science, University of Toronto, Canada
a r t i c l e i n f o
Article history:
Available online 12 December 2008
Keywords:
Proof complexity
Non-classical logics
a b s t r a c t
We give proofs of the effective monotone interpolation property for the system of modal
logic K , and others, and the system IL of intuitionistic propositional logic. Hence we obtain
exponential lower bounds on the number of proof-lines in those systems. The main results
have been given in [P. Hrubeš, Lower bounds for modal logics, Journal of Symbolic Logic 72
(3) (2007) 941–958; P. Hrubeš, A lower bound for intuitionistic logic, Annals of Pure and
Applied Logic 146 (2007) 72–90]; here, we give considerably simplified proofs, as well as
some generalisations.
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1. Introduction
When investigating a proof system S, after the questions of its soundness and completeness have been settled, it is natural
to consider the complexity of proofs in S. For a particular set of S tautologies, wewant to determine the sizes of their shortest
proofs, or to find examples of tautologies which require large proofs in S (where ‘‘large’’ depends on the nature of S). This
problem can be interesting for at least two reasons. First, there is a well known connection between the complexity of
propositional proof systems and some conjectures in computational complexity. Namely, we know that NP 6= coNP iff for
every propositional proof system S there exist propositional tautologies requiring superpolynomial size proofs in S. There is
an analogous connection betweenNP 6= PSPACE and the complexity of proof systems for intuitionistic logic and somemodal
logics, like K . The second motivation can have both a practical and a philosophical face, and it is the relative comparison of
efficiency of proof systems. We can have two proof systems proving the same theorems (or at least equivalent with respect
to some set of formulas), the proofs in one being considerably shorter than in the other. For example, in [6] we have been
given examples of intuitionistic tautologies which require exponential size proofs in IL, but which have linear size classical
proofs. If sizes of proofs can be taken as ameasure of how difficult it is to prove theorems, this corresponds to the experience
that many have had: it is more difficult to work intuitionistically than classically. In this way, proof complexity can study
the function of concepts and tools used in mathematics and perhaps even in the natural language. How does the application
of the excluded middle simplify arguments? Does the use of definitions simplify proofs? How are natural numbers useful?
These are the questions that we can interpret as speed-up relations between proof systems.
Another remarkable aspect of the study of the complexity of intuitionistic proofs is that of determining their
computational content. It is well known that from a proof of a formula ∀x∃yP(x, y) in intuitionistic predicate calculus one can
extract a term s.t. ∀xP(x, t(x)) is a tautology, i.e. we can find a functionwhich to every x assigns a y s.t. P(x, y) is satisfied. This
property is a basic aspect of the intended constructive nature of intuitionistic logic. Moreover, the term t may be understood
as a programme for finding such a y. It has been shown in [3,4] that there even exists a close quantitative connection between
sizes of intuitionistic propositional proofs and Boolean circuits.1 They have shown that the system of intuitionistic logic
enjoys effective interpolation property, which in general means that for a tautology of a certain form and with a proof of
length nwe can find a Boolean circuit of size polynomial in nwhich solves a certain problem. In this paper, we show that the
E-mail address: pahrubes@cs.toronto.edu.
1 A circuit may be conceived as a programme computing a function from set of 0, 1-strings of length k to {0, 1}.
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connection between circuits and intuitionistic proofs is even tighter: we show that IL (and K ) has even effective monotone
interpolation property, i.e. for a suitable choice of tautologies we can guarantee that the circuit in question is monotone.
Monotone Boolean circuits are a well-studied class of Boolean circuits. In [9,1] there were given examples of functions in
NP which require superpolynomial resp. exponential size monotone circuits. This enables us to give examples of IL ( and K )
tautologies A1, A2 . . . s.t. every IL resp. K proof of Ai has an exponential number of proof-lines (in terms of the size of Ai).
The main theorems were already given in [5,6]. The proofs presented here are considerably simpler, more general, and
usemore elementary techniques. The original proof for K was based on amodel-theoretic construction. The advantage, and,
as it now appears, the only advantage, was in showing the affinity between the proof of the lower bound for K , and the proof
of lower bound for monotone circuits (as formulated in [8]). The bound for IL was then obtained by means of a translation
to K . In this paper, we reduce the monotone interpolation for both K and IL to the problem of satisfiability of a set of Horn
clauses, which is shown to be decidable by a quadratic sizemonotone circuit. Hence the proof for IL is now direct and follows
from the fact that in Gentzen style formalisation of IL the inferences can be represented by Horn clauses. We even present
a lower bound on the sizes of generalisation axioms in K , the proof of which employs the simple technique used in [7] (and
similar to [3]). The motivation for stating the proofs in a more standard fashion is, besides that of their simplification, the
following: when the lower boundwas first reached, it was believed (by the author at least) that it requires two components,
the right choice of the hard tautologies, and the model theoretic construction. It was also hoped that a similar construction
could be carried out in much stronger proof systems, perhaps even in classical logic. However, it is now clear that the proof
requires no such extravagant approach, and that in fact the only non-trivial step is the choice of the tautologies. When they
are stated, the proof of their hardness naturally follows.
Can some of the techniques be used to prove lower bounds for classical propositional logic? ’No’ is then the conclusion
of this paper. On the other hand, we can use intuitionistic logic as a background for the study of phenomena which are
beyond our reach, or which do not occur in classical logic. Emil Jeřábek has recently proved a separation between extended
and substitution intuitionistic calculi. In extended intuitionistic calculus we are allowed to use definitions in a proof.2 In
substitution calculus we are allowed to use the rule
ψ(p)
ψ(ξ)
,
where p is a variable and ξ a formula substituted in place of p. Extended and substitution systems for classical logic are
well-known to be polynomially equivalent. In intuitionistic logic, the use of the substitution rule has an exponential speed-
up over the extension rule. Hence, their equivalence in classical logic is, in a sense, merely accidental. A more fundamental
problem that we could attack is:
Does extended intuitionistic calculus have a superpolynomial speed-up over intuitionistic calculus?
In other words, we ask whether the use of definitions can significantly shorten intuitionistic proofs. This problem, as
far as I am aware, had not been completely solved for any proof system,3 and perhaps even a reasonable conditional result
would give an insight into the usefulness of abbreviations.
2. Modal logic
2.1. The system K
The system of modal logic K is obtained by adding the symbol  to propositional logic. In addition to propositional rules
and axioms, K contains the rule of generalisation
A
A
and the axiom of distributivity
(A→ B)→ (A→ B).
The generalisation rule and distributivity axiom will be called modal rules of K . We shall be interested in bounding the
number of applications of modal rules in proofs of K , and hence the specific axiomatisation of the underlying propositional
logic is immaterial.
2.2. Monotone interpolation for K
From the point of view of pure propositional logic, the symbolA is simply a new propositional variable. Themodal rules
of K can be seen as imposing additional structure on those variables. Let us askwhat structure is imposed on the variables by
modal axioms in a proof.Wewill see that the relations between those variables, as imposed by a K proof, can be represented
in a simple way by means of Horn clauses.
2 The so called extension rule has the form q ≡ ψ , where q occurs neither earlier in the proof nor in ψ , nor in the conclusion.
3 Even in classical predicate calculus where we are allowed to define new predicates and terms the problem is tricky, see [2].
196 P. Hrubeš / Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 157 (2009) 194–205
Let S be a K proof. We shall define the characteristic set of clauses for S, CS , as follows:
(1) if a generalisation rule
A
A
occurs in S, we put the clause {A} in CS ,
(2) if a distributivity axiom C → (A→ B) occurs in S, where C = A→ B, we put the clause {¬C,¬A,B} in CS .
We can see that CS is a set of Horn clauses and CS never contains a negative clause (i.e. a clause of the form {¬p1, . . .¬pk}).
|CS | is equal to the number of applications of modal rules in S.
Let us first state a general property of a set of Horn clauses. For an assignment σ to variables V , Vσ will denote the set of
clauses {{v}; v ∈ V , σ (v) = 1}. The total size of a set of clauses C is the sum of sizes of clauses in C.
Proposition 1. (1) LetD be a set of Horn clauses s.t. inD occurs no negative clause. Let Y be a set of negative singular clauses.
Assume thatD, Y is not satisfiable. Then there exists C ∈ Y s.t.D, C is not satisfiable.
(2) LetD be a set of Horn clauses of total size n and not containing a negative clause. Let V be a set of variables and p a variable.
Then there exists a monotone circuit C in variables V of size O(n2) s.t. for every assignment σ of V , C = 1 iff
D, Vσ , {¬p}
is not satisfiable.
Proof. (1). Let us have a resolution refutation ofD ∪ Y ; it contains only Horn clauses. It is easy to see that we can transform
the refutation to a tree-like refutation whose last step is a resolution of some clause in Y . i.e., the last step has the form
{v}, {¬v}
∅ ,
for some {¬v} ∈ Y .When resolving a negative clausewith aHorn clause,we obtain a negative clause. Hence in the resolution
proof of the clause {v} no clause of Y could have been used andD ∪ {¬v} is not satisfiable.
(2). Without loss of generality we can assume that p 6∈ V . For the definition of flowgraph and the relation between
flowgraphs and monotone circuits see page 9. Let us represent a set of Horn clausesD , containing no negative clauses, as a
flowgraph F . (We stipulate that this implies that an empty clause is not inD .) The vertices of F will be the variables inD .
Assume thatD does not contain a clause of size one. IfD is empty we let C := 0 . IfD 6= ∅, for a clause {¬q1, . . .¬qk, q} in
D we shall put a gate from q1, . . . qk to q in F . Let σ be an assignment to V . Clearly, Fσ (p) = 1 iff
D, Vσ , {¬p}
is unsatisfiable. By Proposition 5 there exists a monotone circuit C in variables V of size O(n2) s.t. C(σ (V )) = Fσ (p). Then
C = 1 iffD, Vσ , {¬p} is unsatisfiable.
IfD contains clauses of size one, let V1 be the set of variables occurring as a singular clause inD and letD>1 be the set
of clauses of size > 1 in D . If p ∈ V1 we set C := 1. Otherwise, let C>1 be the circuit constructed from D>1 as above. The
circuit C is then obtained from C>1 by setting the variables V1 to 1 in C>1. 
For a formula α, Awill be called an immediate modal subformula of α, if A has an occurrence in α not in a range of any
modality. Then α can be uniquely written as
β(A1, . . .Ak, s1, . . . sl),
where Ai are its immediate modal subformulas and s1, . . . sl are variables having non-modalised occurrences in α, and β
is a propositional formula. A truth assignment σ to all the immediate modal subformulas and variables occurring in α in a
non-modal context induces a truth assignmentΘσ to α. We defineΘσ (α) as the Boolean value of the formula
β(σ(A1), . . . σ (Ak), σ (s1), . . . σ (sl)).
Lemma 2. Let S = A1, . . . An be a K proof.
(1) Let B1, . . . Bk, B be formulas. Assume that
CS, {B1}, . . . {Bk}, {¬B}
is not satisfiable. Then∧
i=1,...k
Bi → B
is a K tautology.
(2) Assume that σ is an assignment to all immediate modal subformulas in S and the non-modalised variables in S. Assume that
σ satisfies CS . Then
Θσ (Ai) = 1
for every i = 1, . . . n.
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Proof. (1). Let FS be the set of distributivity axioms and the conclusions A of generalisation rules used in S. The definition
of CS andΘσ directly implies the following:
(?) Let σ be an assignment to the immediate modal subformulas in FS . Then σ satisfies CS iff the formulas in FS are true in the
assignmentΘσ .
The proof is then immediate. If CS, {B1}, . . . , {Bk}, {¬B} is not satisfiable then the formula(∧
FS ∧
∧
i=1,...k
Bi
)
→ B
is a tautology which is provable merely by propositional logic. Moreover, the formulas FS are K tautologies and hence∧
i=1,...k
Bi → B
is a K tautology.
(2). By (?) the formulas in FS are satisfied by Θσ . Hence the modal rules in S are satisfied by Θσ . Since the definition of
Θσ commutes with the definition of logical connectives, also the propositional axioms and rules are satisfied byΘσ . 
LetA1, . . .Ak be the immediatemodal subformulas of α. An assignment σ to the variables V = A1, . . .Ak will be called
consistent with respect to α, if there exists a K modelM s.t.M |H α andM |H Ai iff σ(Ai) = 1.
Lemma 3. Let A1, . . . ,Ak be the immediate modal subformulas of α. Let S be a K proof of
α→ (β1 ∨ β2).
Let V = A1, . . .Ak. Let σ be a consistent assignment to V with respect to α. Then the set of clauses
CS, Vσ , {¬β1}, {¬β2}
is not satisfiable.
Proof. Let Yσ := {{¬v}; v ∈ V , σ (v) = 0}. Let us first show that
D := CS, Vσ , Yσ , {¬β1}, {¬β2}
is not satisfiable. Assume, for the sake of contradiction, that ρ is an assignment satisfyingD . Then σ ⊆ ρ. LetM be a model
s.t. M |H α and M |H Ai iff σ(Ai) = 1. Let s be the list of variables occurring in a non-modal context in S. Let ρ ′ be
the assignment to s s.t. ρ ′(s) = 1 iff M |H s. Let σ ′ := ρ ∪ ρ ′. We can assume that σ ′ is defined on all immediate modal
subformulas and non-modalised variables in S. By Lemma 2, the assignment Θσ ′ satisfies all the steps in S. Moreover, we
can see thatΘσ ′(α) = 1,Θσ ′(β1) = Θσ ′(β2) = 0, and henceΘσ ′(α→ (β1 ∨ β2)) = 0, which is a contradiction.
Let us show that also CS, Vσ , {¬β1}, {¬β2} is not satisfiable. The clauses from Yσ , {¬β1}, {¬β2} are the only
negative clauses in D . Hence, by Proposition 1, there exists C ∈ Yσ , {¬β1}, {¬β2} s.t. CS, X, C is not satisfiable. Let
us show it is one of {¬β1}, {¬β2}. Assume the contrary. Then C = {¬Aj} for some Aj, j ∈ 1, . . . k. Then, by part (1) of
Lemma 2,
K `
∧
Ai∈Vσ
Ai → Aj.
ButM |H∧Ai∈Vσ Ai andM |H Aj which is a contradiction. 
For a circuit C , [C]will denote an equivalent Boolean formula, i.e., some formula defining the same Boolean function.
Theorem 4. Let S be a K proof of the formula
α→ (β1 ∨ β2).
Let A1, . . .Ak be the immediate modal subformulas of α. Assume that S contains n modal rules. Then there exist monotone
circuits C1 and C2 of size O(n2) in k variables s.t. the following are K tautologies:
(1) α(A1, . . .Ak, s)→ [C1](A1, . . .Ak) ∨ [C2](A1, . . .Ak),
(2) [C1](A1, . . .Ak)→ β1, and [C2](A1, . . .Ak)→ β2.
Proof. Let CS be the characteristic set of clauses for S. The total size of CS is≤ 3n, since every clause in CS has size at most
three. Let V = A1, . . .Ak. Let C1 be the circuit of size O(n2) in variables V from Proposition 1 s.t. for any assignment σ to
V , C1 = 1 iff CS, Vσ , {¬β1} is unsatisfiable. Similarly for C2 and β2.
Let us show that α(A1, . . .Ak, s)→ [C1](A1, . . .Ak) ∨ [C2](A1, . . .Ak) is a K tautology. Let M be a K model s.t.
M |H α and let σ be an assignment to V s.t. σ(Ai) = 1 iffM |H Ai. By Lemma 3, CS, Vσ , {¬β1}, {¬β2} is unsatisfiable.
Hence C1(σ (V )) = 1 or C2(σ (V )) = 1 and henceM |H [C1](A1, . . .Ak) orM |H [C2](A1, . . .Ak).
Let us show that (1) is a K tautology. Assume that M |H [C1](A1, . . .Ak) and let σ be as above. Then, by definition of
C1, CS, Vσ , {¬β1} is unsatisfiable. Hence, by Lemma 2 part (1)∧
σ(Ai)=1
Ai → β1
is a K tautology. But the conjunction on the left hand side contains the formulas true inM and hence alsoM |H β1. 
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Remark. Note that we do not restrict the formulas α, β1 and β2 in any way. In particular, α is allowed to contain non-
modalised variables, negations of modal subformulas, and nested modalities. However, the important applications of the
Theorem are in the case when the formulas have quite a simple form.
Corollary. Letα(p1, . . .pk, s)→ (β1(p, r1)∨β2(p, r2)) be a K tautology, whereα(p1, . . . pk, s),β1 andβ2 do not contain
any modalities. Assume that S is a proof of the tautology with n modal rules. Then there exist monotone circuits C1 and C2 of size
O(n2) in variables p with the following properties: for any assignment σ to the variables p
(1) if α(p, s) is true (for some assignment to s) then C1(p) = 1 or C2(p) = 1,
(2) if C1(p) = 1 resp. C2(p) = 1 then β1 resp. β2 is true (for any assignment to r1 resp. r2.)
Proof. Follows from the previous theorem and the fact that if A is a K tautology then the propositional formula A0, obtained
from A by deleting all the boxes, is a classical tautology. 
Flowgraphs and monotone circuits
A flowgraph F is a directed graphwith edges uniquely labelled by subsets of vertices in the following fashion. For a vertex
a of F , Pred(a) will denote the set of vertices b s.t. there is an edge from b to a. We than require that there exists a disjoint
partition of Pred(a) into sets X1, . . . Xk s.t. for every i = 1, . . . k and b ∈ Xi the edge from b to a is labelled by Xi. The set of
edges from Xi to awill be called a gate from Xi to a. The intended meaning of a gate from Xi to a is: if all the vertices in X are
‘‘true" then the vertex a is also ‘‘true".
Let us have a fixed subset V of the vertices of F . Let σ be a 0, 1-assignment to the vertices V . A possible solution of a
flowgraph G is a 0, 1-assignment ρ to the vertices of G s.t.
(1) if σ(v) = 1 then ρ(v) = 1, for v ∈ V ,
(2) for every a and a gate from X to a , if ρ(b) = 1 for every b ∈ X then ρ(a) = 1.
The solution of F for σ is the 0, 1 - assignment Fσ to vertices of F s.t. for every vertex a, Fσ (a) = 0 iff there exists a possible
solution ρ s.t. ρ(a) = 0. We can see that a vertex a is assigned 1 in Fσ iff there exists at least one gate from X to b s.t.
Fσ (b) = 1 for all b ∈ X . Hence Fσ is the minimum possible solution of F for σ .
The following proposition shows that flowgraphs can be simulated by monotone circuits.
Proposition 5. Let F be a flowgraph with n edges. Let a be a vertex in F . Then there exists a monotone circuit C in variables V of
size O(n2) s.t. for every assignment σ to V
C(σ (V )) = Fσ (a).
Proof. Wewill first show thatwe can find an acyclic flowgraph F ? of sizeO(n2) s.t. for any assignment σ to V , Fσ (a) = F ?σ (a).
Assume that F has k vertices a1, . . . ak. Hence k ≤ 2n, as we can assume that F does not contain isolated vertices.
The construction is straightforward: for every vertex a of F , we introduce k copies a1, . . . ak. The flowgraph F ? will have
k2 vertices aj, a ∈ F , j = 1 . . . k and the gates will be defined as follows:
(1) For every j = 1, . . . k− 1 and for every a ∈ F we put in F ? a gate from aj to aj+1.
(2) For every j = 1, . . . k− 1 and a gate from X to a in F , we add a gate from X j := {bj, b ∈ X} to aj+1 in F ?.
Finally, we identify the vertices v1 of F ? with v for v ∈ V and we identify the vertex a ofM with its copy ak in F ?. Clearly, F ?
contains O(n2) edges and Fσ (a) = F ?σ (a) for any assignment.
The construction gives an acyclic flowgraph s.t. there are no edges leading to the vertices in V . It is now sufficient to prove
that for such a flowgraph F with n edges and a vertex a of F there exists amonotone circuit C of sizeO(n) s.t. C(σ (V )) = Fσ (a)
for any σ . To a vertex v ∈ V we will assign the circuit v, and to a leaf of a different kind the constant 0. Assume that for
a vertex b ∈ F we have assigned circuits Cd to all d ∈ Pred(b). For a gate from X ⊆ Pred(b) to b, let CX be the circuit∧
d∈X Cd. Then we assign to b the disjunction of CX , for all gates from X to b. Such a circuit has size O(n) and has the required
property. 
2.3. Extension to other modal systems
In the proof of Theorem 4we used only the fact that the characteristic set of clauses of a proof is a set of Horn clauses not
containing negative clauses, and the clauses have a bounded size. These assumptions are equally satisfied in the systems K4,
Gödel-Löb’s logic and some others (like the NP system K +  ⊥). For example, the K4 axiom
A→ A
receives the clause
{¬A,A}.
The characteristic set of clauses of S or S4 proof would be defined by transforming the proof into K resp. K4 proof by means
of the translation A→ A ∧ A.
The theorem and its corollary4 hold also for those systems without modification. Extending the result to S5 is impossible,
as observed in [5]. A deeper explanation follows from the fact there exists a kind of simulation between extended S5 and
classical extended Frege systems. This, we hope, will one day appear in a paper by Emil Jeřábek.
4 However, the proof of the corollary would need a modification in the case of Gödel-Löb’s logic and K +  ⊥.
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2.4. Counting the number of distributivity axioms and the number of generalisation rules in K
It will be noted that Theorem 4 is true also if we count only the number of distributivity axioms in a K proof. This
would be achieved by assigning all singular clauses in the characteristic set of clauses of a proof (corresponding exactly
to the conclusions of generalisation rules) to 1, and applying the argument to such a restricted characteristic set. This fact
corresponds to the intuition that it is the distributivity axiom which is responsible for complexity of modal proofs. It may
therefore be surprising that the same is true when the size of generalisation rules is considered, as we will show here.
LetA be a set of formulas. cl(A)will denote the smallest set s.t.
(1) A ⊆ cl(A)
(2) if A, A→ B ∈ cl(A) then also B ∈ cl(A).
In other words, cl(A) is the closure ofA under modus ponens.
For a proof S, the set of generalised formulas of S, GS , will be the set of formulas A s.t. the rule
A
A
occurs in S. The generalisation size of S will be the total size of GS , i.e., the sum of sizes of formulas in G. For a formula A let
us introduce a fresh variable 〈A〉.
Lemma 6. Let G andA = {A1, . . . Ak} be sets of formulas, the total size of G ∪A being n. Let B be a formula. Then there exists a
monotone circuit C in variables V = 〈A1〉, . . . 〈Ak〉 of size O(n2) s.t. for any assignment σ of V , C = 1 iff
B ∈ cl(G, Vσ ),
where Vσ := {Ai ∈ A; σ(〈Ai〉) = 1}.
Proof. Let us represent the set G∪A by a flowgraph F of size n. Its vertices will be the subformulas of formulas in G andA.
For a vertex of F of the form A→ Bwe connect A and A→ B to B by a gate. Clearly, for an assignment σ to V , B ∈ cl(G, Vσ )
iff Fσ (B) = 1, and the statement then follows from Proposition 5. 
Lemma 7. (1) Let G be a finite set of K tautologies. LetA be a finite set of formulas. Assume that B ∈ cl(G ∪A). Then∧
A ∈A
A→ B
is a K tautology.
(2) Let S = A1, . . . An be a K proof. LetA be a set of formulas. Let σ be a truth assignment to all immediate modal subformulas
and variables occurring in non modal context in S s.t. σ(A) = 1 iff A ∈ cl(A,GS). Then
Θσ (Ai) = 1,
for i = 1, . . . n (Θσ is defined as in Lemma 2).
Proof. (1). Let X be a finite set of formulas. Define cli(X), i ∈ ω as follows: cl0(X) := X and cli+1(X) is the set of all formulas
B for which there exists a formula C s.t. C → B, C ∈ cli(X). Then cl(X) = ⋃i∈ω cli(X). By induction with respect to i one
can prove that if B ∈ cli(X) then∧A∈X A → B is a tautology. For i = 0 it is trivial. If B ∈ cli+1(X) then there exists a C
s.t. C → B, C ∈ cli(X), and hence∧A∈X A→ C and∧A∈X A→ (C → B) are tautologies. Hence∧A∈X A→ B is a
tautology, using the axiomof distributivity. IfX = G∪AwhereG is a set ofK tautologieswe obtain that also∧A ∈A A→ B
is a K tautology.
(2). It is easy to see that Θσ satisfies all the axioms and rules S. The generalisation rule is satisfied trivially (all the
conclusions are assigned 1 by definition). Distributivity axioms are satisfied by the definition of cl. Propositional rules and
axioms are satisfied sinceΘσ commutes with propositional connectives. 
Lemma 8. Let α be a formula and letA = A1, . . . , Ak be its immediate modal subformulas, let V = 〈A1〉, . . . , 〈Ak〉. Let S be a K
proof of
α→ (β1 ∨ β2).
Let σ be a consistent assignment to V with respect to α. Then either β1 or β2 is in cl(GS ∪ Vσ ).
Proof. As in Lemma 3. 
Theorem 9. Let S be a K proof of the formula
α→ (β1 ∨ β2).
Let A1, . . .Ak be the immediate modal subformulas of α, having total size k. Assume that the total size of formulas generalised
in S is n. Then there exist monotone circuits C1 and C2 in variables v1, . . . vk of size O(n+ k)2 s.t. the following are K tautologies:
(1) α(A1, . . .Ak, s)→ [C1](A1, . . .Ak) ∨ [C2](A1, . . .Ak),
(2) [C1](A1, . . .Ak)→ β1, and [C2](A1, . . .Ak)→ β2.
Proof. As in Theorem 4. 
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2.5. Examples of hard K tautologies
We shall now use the corollary of Theorem 4 to give particular examples of hard K tautologies.
Example 1. - α(p, s)→ β .
Assume that α(p, s) and β(p, r) are formulas containing no . We will say that a circuit C in variables p interpolates α
and β , if for any assignment σ to p
(1) if α(p, s) is true (for some assignment to s) then C(p) = 1,
(2) if C(p) = 1 then β(p, r) is true (for any assignment to r .)
We will say that a formula α is monotone in p, if it can be transformed to a DNF form where no negation is attached to a
variable in p.
Proposition 10. Let α(p, r) be a propositional formula monotone in p and let β(p, s) be a propositional formula.
(1) If α(p, r)→ β(p, s) is a propositional tautology then α(p, r)→ β(p, s) is a K-tautology.
(2) Assume that
α(p, r)→ β(p, s)
is provable in K with n distributivity axioms. Then there exists a monotone circuit of size O(n2)which interpolates α(p, r) and
β(p, s).
Proof. (1). Note that if α(p, s) → β(p, s) is a classical tautology then there exists a monotone formula γ (p) s.t. (i)
α(p, s)→ γ (p) and (ii) γ (p)→ β(p, s) are propositional tautologies. Hence alsoα(p, s)→ γ (p) andγ (p)→ β(p, s)
are K tautologies, the former by substituting p for p in (i) and the latter by applying generalisation and distributivity to
(ii). On the other hand, since γ is a monotone formula, then also γ (p)→ γ (p) can be proved in K by successive use of K
tautologies A ◦ B→ (A ◦ B), where ◦ = ∧,∨.
(2) is an immediate application of Corollary of Theorem 4 for β1 := β , β2 :=⊥. 
Let
Cliquekn(p, r)
be the proposition asserting that r is a clique of size k on the graph represented by p. Let
Colorkn(p, s)
be the proposition asserting that s is a k-coloring of the graph represented by p.
Theorem 11. LetΘkn be the formula
Cliquek+1n (p, r)→ (¬Colorkn(p, s)).
ThenΘkn is K tautology. Moreover, if k :=
√
n then every K-proof of the tautologyΘkn contains at least
2Ω(n
1
4 )
modal rules.
Proof. ThatΘkn is a tautology follows from part (1) of the previous proposition. Let k :=
√
n. Assume thatΘkn has a K -proof
withmmodal rules. By the previous proposition, there is a monotone interpolant C of Cliquekn(p, r) and¬Colorkn(p, s) of size
O(m2). By [1], every such circuit has size at least 2Ω(n
1
4 ). Hencem ∼
√
2Ω(n
1
4 )) ∼ 2Ω(n
1
4 ). 
Example 2-
∧
(p ∨ q)→ (β1 ∨ β2).
If β is a propositional formula in variables and p = p1, . . . pn, q = q1, . . . qn then β(p/¬q) will denote the formula
obtained by substituting¬qi for pi, i = 1, . . . n, in β . We may also write simply β(¬q) if the meaning is clear.
Lemma 12. Let β1 = β1(p, r1) and β2 = β2(q, r2) be propositional formulas, p, q, r1, r2 disjoint. Let p = p1, . . . pn and
q = q1, . . . qn. Assume that β1 is monotone in p or β2 is monotone in q. Assume that
β1(p, r1) ∨ β2(¬p, r2)
is a classical tautology.
(1) Then
∧
i=1,...n(pi ∨ qi)→ β1(p, r1) ∨ β2(q, r2) is a classical tautology.
(2) Let M,N be subsets of {1, . . . n} s.t. M ∪ N = {1, . . . n}. Then one of the following is a classical tautology:∧
i∈M
pi → β1(p, r1), or
∧
i∈N
qi → β2(q, r2).
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Proof. (1). Assume that, for example, β2 is monotone in q. Then∧
i=1,...n
(pi → qi)→ (β2(p, r2)→ β2(q, r2))
is a tautology. Hence also∧
i=1,...n
(¬pi ∨ qi)→ (β2(p, r2)→ β2(q, r2)),∧
i=1,...n
(pi ∨ qi)→ (β2(¬p, r2)→ β2(q, r2))
are tautologies. From the assumption that β1(p, r1) ∨ β2(¬p, r2) is a tautology we obtain that also∧
i=1,...n
(pi ∨ qi)→ (β1(p, r1) ∨ β2(q, r2))
is a tautology.
(2). LetM and N be fixed. Clearly,∧
i∈M
pi ∧
∧
i∈N
qi →
∧
i=1,...n
(pi ∨ qi)
is a tautology and, by (1),∧
i∈M
pi ∧
∧
i∈N
qi → (β1(p, r1) ∨ β2(q, r2))
is a tautology. Since β1 and β2 contain no common variables, and β1, resp. β2 does not contain the variables q, resp. p then
either
∧
i∈M pi → β1(p, r1) or
∧
i∈N qi → β2(q, r2) is a tautology. 
Proposition 13. Let β1 = β1(p, r1) and β2 = β2(q, r2) be propositional formulas, p, q, r1, r2 disjoint. Let p = p1, . . . pk and
q = q1, . . . qk. Assume that β1 is monotone in p or β2 is monotone in q. Assume that
β1(p, r1) ∨ β2(¬p, r2)
is a classical tautology.
(1) Then ∧
i=1,...k
(pi ∨ qi)→ (β1(p, r1) ∨ β2(q, r2))
is K- tautology.
(2) Moreover, if the tautology has a K-proof with n distributivity axioms then there exists a monotone circuit C(p) of size O(n2)
which interpolates¬β2(¬p, r2) and β1(p, r1).
Proof. Let us first show that the formula is a tautology. The assumption
∧
i=1,...k(pi ∨ qi) can be transformed to a
disjunction of conjunctions of the form∧
i∈M
pi ∧
∧
i∈N
qi
such thatM ∪ N = {1, . . . k}. Hence it is sufficient to show that for suchM and N∧
i∈M
pi ∧
∧
i∈N
qi → (β1 ∨ β2) (?)
is a tautology. By the previous Lemma either
∧
i∈M pi → β1 or
∧
i∈N qi → β2 is a classical tautology. In the first case∧
i∈M pi → β1 is a tautology and hence also (?) is. Similarly in the latter case.
By the corollary of Theorem 4 there exist monotone circuits D1 and D2 in variables p, q of size O(n2) s.t. for any
assignment
(D1(p, q) = 1)→ β1, (1)
(D2(p, q) = 1)→ β2 (2)
and if the assignment satisfies
∧
i=1,...k(pi ∨ qi) then
D1(p, q) = 1 ∨ D2(p, q) = 1.
This in particular gives
D1(p,¬p) = 1 ∨ D2(p,¬p) = 1. (3)
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Let C(p) := D1(p, 1, . . . 1) and C ′(q) := D2(1, . . . 1, q). Since in (1) β1 does not contain q, we have
(C(p) = 1)→ β1(p, r1). (4)
Similarly, by replacing q by ¬p in (2) we have
(C ′(¬p) = 1)→ β2(¬p, r2). (5)
Since D1 and D2 are monotone, (3) gives
D1(p, 1, . . . 1) = 1 ∨ D2(1, . . . 1,¬p) = 1
and hence
C(p) = 1 ∨ C ′(¬p) = 1. (6)
Let us show that the circuit C interpolates¬β2(¬p, r2) andβ1(p, r1). By (4) it is sufficient to prove that if for some assignment
¬β2(¬p, r2) is true then C(p) = 1. But if ¬β2(¬p, r2) is true then by (5) C ′(¬p) = 0 and, by (6), C(p) = 1. 
Theorem 14. Let
Θkn :=
∧
i=1,...n
(pi ∨ qi)→ ¬Colorkn(p, s) ∨ ¬Cliquek+1n (¬q, r).
If k := √n then very K-proof of the tautologyΘkn contains at least
2Ω(n
1
4 )
modal rules.
Proof. We shall apply Proposition 13 to the formulas β1 := ¬Colorkn(p, s) and β2 := ¬Cliquek+1n (¬q, r). First, β2 is
monotone in q since Clique(p, r) ismonotone in p. Second,β1(p, s)∨β2(q/¬p, r) is a classical tautology, sinceβ2(q/¬p, r) =
¬Cliquek+1n (p/¬¬p, r) is classically equivalent to¬Cliquek+1n (p, r) and
¬Colorkn(p, s) ∨ ¬Cliquek+1n (p, r)
is a classical tautology. Hence Θkn is a K tautology. Assume that it has a K proof with m modal rules. Then there exists a
monotone circuit C in variables p of size O(m2) which interpolates ¬β2(q/¬p, r) and β1. Since ¬β2(q/¬p, r) is classically
equivalent to Cliquek+1n (p, r), C interpolates Clique
k+1
n (p, r) and ¬Colorkn(p, s). By the result in [1] every such circuit must
have size at least 2Ω(n
1
4 ). Hencem ≥
√
2Ω(n
1
4 ) ∼ 2Ω(n
1
4 ). 
3. Intuitionistic logic
3.1. The system IL
We will use a Gentzen style axiomatisation of intuitionistic logic. In a sequent Γ ⇒ ∆, Γ and∆ are understood as sets
of formulas. The axioms are A⇒ A and⊥⇒ A. The inferences will be the cut
Γ ⇒ ∆, A, Γ , A⇒ ∆
Γ ⇒ ∆ ,
the weakening
Γ ⇒ ∆
Γ ,Σ ⇒ ∆,Π ,
and the inferences
LEFT RIGHT
Γ , A⇒ ∆
Γ , A ∧ B⇒ ∆ ,
Γ , B⇒ ∆
Γ , A ∧ B⇒ ∆
Γ ⇒ A
Γ ⇒ A ∨ B ,
Γ ⇒ B
Γ ⇒ A ∨ B
Γ , A⇒ C, Γ , B⇒ C
Γ , A ∨ B⇒ C
Γ ⇒ A, Γ ⇒ B
Γ ⇒ A ∧ B ,
Γ ⇒ A,∆, Γ , B⇒ ∆
Γ , A→ B⇒ ∆
Γ , A⇒ B
Γ ⇒ A→ B ,
An IL proof of a formula A is a proof of the sequent⇒ A. The sequent size of a proof S is the sum of |Γ | + |∆| for sequents
Γ ⇒ ∆ in S. The sizes of formulas in S are not considered in the sequent size of S. The sequent size of a proof of A corresponds
to the number of proof-lines in a Hilbert style proof of A.
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3.2. Monotone interpolation for IL
As before, we shall now define a characteristic set of clauses CS for an IL proof S. We shall consider only the right
introduction rules of S. Recall that for a formula A, 〈A〉 denotes a new propositional variable. For any use of a right rule
in S whose conclusion has the form
A1, . . . Ak ⇒ B
we put in CS the clause
{¬〈A1〉, . . .¬〈Ak〉, 〈B〉}.
We can see that CS is a set of Horn clauses, containing no negative clause. |CS | is equal to the number of right inferences in
S, and the total size of CS is bounded by the sequent size of S.
Wewill now show that a truth assignment satisfying the set of characteristic clauses of a proof can be extended to a truth
assignment satisfying the sequents in S. Let A be a formula. For the logical connectives ◦ = ∧,∨,→ the respective Boolean
operations will be denoted ◦B = ∧B,∨B,→B. Assume that σ is a truth assignment to variables 〈B〉 for all subformulas B of
A. Then the assignmentΘσ (A)will be defined as follows:
(1) Θσ (p) = σ 〈p〉, for p a variable,Θσ (⊥) = 0,
(2) Θσ (B ◦ C) = σ 〈B ◦ C〉 ∧B (Θσ (B) ◦B Θσ (C))
We can see that for any σ
(i) Θσ (⊥) = 0,
(ii) Θσ (A) = σ 〈A〉 ∧B Θσ (A), and
(iii) Θσ (A ◦ B) ≤ Θσ (A) ◦B Θσ (B).
Moreover, from (ii) we obtain that if σ satisfies the clause {¬〈A1〉, . . .¬〈Ak〉, 〈A〉} then
(iv) mini=1,...kΘσ (Ai) ≤ σ 〈A〉.
We shall say that a sequent Γ ⇒ ∆ is satisfied by Θσ iff minA∈Γ Θσ (A) ≤ maxA∈∆Θσ (A), where minimum of empty set is
one and the maximum zero.
Lemma 15. Let S = Π1, . . .Πn be an IL proof.
(1) Let B1, . . . Bk and B be formulas. Let CS, {〈B1〉}, . . . {〈Bk〉}, {¬〈B〉} be unsatisfiable. Then∧
i=1,...k
Bi → B
is an IL tautology.
(2) Let σ be an assignment to all variables 〈B〉 s.t. B is a subformula of some formula in S. Assume that σ satisfies CS . Then every
Πi in S is satisfied byΘσ .
Proof. (1) is clear. (Compare with Lemma 2.)
(2). The axiom A⇒ A is satisfied trivially, and⊥⇒ A is satisfied because of the condition (i). Let us show that for a rule
in S if its premise is satisfied by Θσ then so is its conclusion. For weakening and cut rule the statement holds trivially. As
remarked in (iii), we haveΘσ (A ◦ B) ≤ Θσ (A) ◦B Θσ (B). This implies that the left introduction rules are satisfied byΘσ , for
any σ . Assume that σ satisfies CS and let us have an instance of a right introduction rule in S. For example, let us take the
rule
Γ , A⇒ B
Γ ⇒ A→ B .
Let a := minγ∈Γ Θσ (γ ). By the assumption we have
min(a,Θσ (A)) ≤ Θσ (B) (?)
and we want to show that
a ≤ Θσ (A→ B) = σ 〈A→ B〉 ∧B (Θσ (A)→B Θσ (B)). (??)
From (?)we have a ≤ Θσ (A)→B Θσ (B). Since σ satisfies CS , it also satisfies the clause {¬〈γ 〉, γ ∈ Γ , 〈A→ B〉} and from
(iv) we obtain that a ≤ σ 〈A→ B〉, which implies (??). The other rules are analogous. 
A formula α will be calledmonotone, if it contains only the connectives ∧ and ∨.
Lemma 16. Let S be an IL proof of the formula α → (β1 ∨ β2), where α is a monotone formula in variables p. Let σ be a 0, 1-
assignment to p s.t. α is true under σ . Let Vσ be the set of clauses of the form {〈γ 〉}, where γ is a subformula of α true under the
assignment σ . Then
CS, Vσ , {¬〈β1〉}, {¬〈β2〉}
is not satisfiable.
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Proof. Assume that ρ is an assignment which satisfies CS, Vσ , {¬〈β1〉}, {¬〈β2〉}. We can assume that ρ is defined on
all subformulas of formulas in S. From the definition of Θρ we obtain that Θρ(α) = 1, Θρ(β1) = Θρ(β2) = 0 and
Θρ(α→ (β1 ∨ β2)) = 0. But that contradicts the previous Lemma. 
Theorem 17. Let α be a monotone formula in variables p and of size k. Assume that S is an IL proof of the tautology
α→ β1 ∨ β2.
Assume that the sequent size of S is n. Then there exist monotone circuits C1 and C2 of size O(n2+k) in variables p s.t. the following
are IL tautologies:
(1) α→ [C1] ∨ [C2],
(2) [C1] → β1, and [C2] → β2.
Proof. Let V be the set of variables of the form 〈γ 〉, where γ is a subformula of α. Let q := 〈β1〉, r := 〈β2〉. The total size of
CS is ≤ n. Let Cq be a monotone circuit in variables V of size O(n2) s.t. for any assignment σ to V , Cq = 1 iff C, Vσ , {¬q} is
unsatisfiable, where Vσ = {{v} ∈ V ; σ(v) = 1}. Let C1 be the circuit obtained by substituting γ for 〈γ 〉 in Cq. It is amonotone
circuit in variables p, and we can assume that it has size O(n2+ k). Similarly for Cr and C2. The proof then proceeds like that
of Theorem 4. 
3.3. A hard IL tautology
As in Section 2.5 we now use Theorem 17 to obtain hard IL tautologies.
Proposition 18. Let β1 = β1(p, r1) and β2 = β2(q, r2) be propositional formulas, p, q, r1, r2 disjoint. Let p = p1, . . . pk and
q = q1, . . . qk. Assume that β1 is monotone in p or β2 is monotone in q. Assume that
β1(p, r1) ∨ β2(¬p, r2)
is a classical tautology.
(1) Then ∧
i=1,...k
(pi ∨ qi)→ (¬¬β1 ∨ ¬¬β2)
is IL-tautology.
(2) If the tautology has IL proof of sequent size n then there exists a monotone circuit C(p) of size O((n2 + k) which interpolates
¬β2(¬p, r2) and β1(p, r1).
Proof. Let us first show that the formula is a tautology. The assumption
∧
i=1,...k(pi ∨ qi) can be transformed to an
intuitionistically equivalent disjunction of conjunctions of the form∧
i∈M
pi ∧
∧
i∈N
qi
such thatM ∪ N = {1, . . . k}. Hence it is sufficient to show that for suchM and N∧
i∈M
pi ∧
∧
i∈N
qi → (¬¬β1 ∨ ¬¬β2) (?)
is an intuitionistic tautology. By Lemma 12 either
∧
i∈M pi → β1 or
∧
i∈N qi → β2 is a classical tautology. In the first case(∧
i∈M
pi → ¬¬β1
)
is an intuitionistic tautology, since the double negation enables one to reproduce the classical proof in IL. The latter case is
similar.
Part (2) follows from Theorem 17 in a similar way to the proof of Proposition 13. 
Corollary. Let p = p1 . . . pn and q = q1, . . . qn and let p, q, r, s be disjoint. Let
Θkn :=
∧
i=1,...n
(pi ∨ qi)→ (¬Colorkn(p, s) ∨ ¬Cliquek+1n (p/¬q, r)).
ThenΘkn is an IL-tautology. If k :=
√
n then every IL-proof of the tautologyΘkn contains at least
2Ω(n
1
4 )
proof-lines.
Proof. As in Corollary of Proposition 14. Note that we omit the double negation in front of ¬Clique resp. ¬Color, since ¬A
and¬¬¬A are intuitionistically equivalent. 
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